We perform an event study to investigate the efficiency of the Chinese stock market. We study the reaction of stock returns and trading volumes to the 2005-2006 structural reform which allowed the transformation of non-tradable shares (NTS) into tradable shares (TS) through payment of a compensation to holders of TS. We find evidence of positive abnormal returns in the few days before the announcement of which companies will undergo the reform process and in the ten days after the readmission to trading of participating companies following the determination of the compensation, but no abnormal returns after the payment itself. From a methodological viewpoint, our contribution is the introduction of a bootstrap procedure that is designed to replicate the actual degree of covariance across firms.
Introduction
The efficiency of the Chinese stock market is a very important issue given its large capitalization ($3.9 trillion at end January 2014) and China's rapid growth. One of the main functions of the stock market is to improve the allocation of capital by signaling its relative scarcity in different sectors via equity prices. This crucial purpose may be attained only if prices are valuation efficient. In this paper we assess valuation efficiency by studying price reactions to a recent stock market reform, through an event study. This methodology is particularly useful given that the Chinese stock market only opened in 1991 (with a small number of traded companies representing a severe limitation in respect of statistical methods that require long time-series to produce reliable estimates. Moreover, as reported by Carpenter et al. (2014) , the Chinese stock market has experienced a sequence of structural breaks associated with different institutional and regulatory reforms. Time-series models are not suited to dealing with structural breaks, unless the dates of the break are known and specific corrections are implemented. Instead, we take a different approach and exploit the cross-sectional pricing implications of the 2005-2006 transformation of non-tradable shares (NTS) into tradable shares (TS) to study efficiency.
The reform entailed a process whereby NTS holders paid compensation to TS holders in exchange for the right to sell their shares in the future. Compensation is consistent with the idea that the transformation of NTS into TS may damage the current TS holders, who in the past decided to hold shares under the assumption that NTS would have never been turned into TS (see Chen and Xiong, 2001) . After successful initial experiments with a small number of firms, in August 2005 the Chinese authorities extended the reform to all companies listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen markets, setting the end of 2006 as the deadline for its completion. Each participating company had to respect a schedule implying two trading suspensions and subsequent readmissions. The first suspension predated the announcement of the value of the compensation to be paid to holders of TS, the second suspension took place before the actual payment. Typically (almost 80% of the cases) compensation was represented by the transfer of shares from NTS holders to TS holders. In theory this form of compensation does not affect a company's market valuation. However, if the demand function is downward sloping, there can be negative effects on the price of the shares associated with an increase in supply, or positive effects associated with the increased liquidity and visibility of the stocks. We carry out an event study and measure the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of stocks as well as turnover, to understand whether the stock price reaction was roughly consistent with these rational models of pricing behavior.
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Our main findings are as follows: risk-adjusted stock prices increased both in the days immediately prior to the first suspension (by more than 2%) and in the ten days after the first readmission (about 1.7%). Prices fell after the end of the reform, but compensation-corrected abnormal returns were not statistically different from zero for the subsequent ten-day period.
Turnover increased substantially in all the event periods, particularly after the second readmission. Our findings are coherent with the existence of inside information about the identity of the participating companies, because a risk premium would not suddenly materialize on the day/four days before the first announcement. The increase in the price after the first readmission may be due to a decrease in expected returns associated with expectations of improved liquidity and/or to the existence of a visibility (Merton) effect. It is noteworthy that prices show no abnormal pattern after the end of the reform. The results are robust to a variety of tests, notably the estimation of a multi-factor model for the Chinese stock market.
The selection of a CARs methodology rather than a regression-based methodology (for an extended comparison see Kothari and Warner, 2005) , is due to the specificity of our data. The reform was implemented through two periods of trading suspension for each stock.
It was therefore impossible to estimate a linear regression involving dummy variables that control for the change in the intercept during the event periods. Moreover, the set-up of the reform required careful treatment of cross-sectional correlation across firms. Hein and Westfall (2004) deal with bootstrap methods to improve statistical testing in the presence of clustering when using the multivariate regression model. Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) suggest a bootstrap version of a skewness-adjusted t-statistic to control for the skewness in their tests of long-run abnormal returns in a CARs setting. We also used a bootstrap methodology to make our statistical inference robust to the presence of clustering. Our paper differs from previous studies. We neither study the relation between bubbles and speculation, as in Mei, Scheinkman and Xiong (2009), nor do we consider the cross-section of stock returns from a predictive viewpoint, as in Baker and Wurgler (2006) . Instead, we consider company-specific event windows, involving periods of trading and nontrading, and examine whether the reaction of prices to well-identified announcements and corporate actions is compatible with market efficiency. Several papers have looked at the efficiency of the Chinese and Asian stock markets, applying various methodologies (see Charles and Darné, 2009 , for a list of contributions). Kim and Shamsuddin (2008) test for the martingale hypothesis in the stock prices and find weak-form efficiency for Hong Kong but inefficiency for other Asian stock markets. Charles and Darné (2009) apply the variance ratio 7 test to the Chinese market and find that B-shares are significantly inefficient although Ashares seem more efficient. Groenewold, Tang and Wu (2003) study the predictability of returns and find deviations from market efficiency; evidence of predictability of stock returns is also found in the presence of volatility clustering by Chen and Hong (2003) . Gao and Kling (2005) find evidence of calendar effects in the Chinese market with excess returns in March and in April and on Fridays, while Chong, Lam and Yan (2011) study the profitability of trading strategies and suggest that China's stock market has become more efficient since the reform. DeBondt et al. (2010) identify booms and busts using a fundamental-based model. Chen et al. (2010) look at a variety of characteristics drawn from the literature and show that their predictive ability is weaker than in the U.S.A., which they interpret as evidence of persistent mispricing. Carpenter et al. (2014) argue that the Chinese stock market is increasingly able to provide stock price informativeness and is characterized by anomalies resembling those prevailing in the U.S. market.
Several other papers study the split-share reform. Lu, Balatbat and Czernkowski (2012) examine the reaction of prices both to the reform's general announcement and the company-specific announcements, with particular regard to compensation characteristics for a sample of firms. Li, Wang, Cheung and Jiang (2011) study the reform on the basis of a general equilibrium model explaining compensation on the basis of company and shareholders characteristics; Haveman and Wang (2008) also discuss the struggle to reach agreement among different types of shareholders. Liao, Li, Liu and Wang (2011) study what happens to prices on the day of the lockup expiration and Huang, Su and Ching (2008) apply structural break tests to prices before and after the reform. Our paper is different: we study all Chinese stocks and consider all the different phases of the reform. Moreover we assess the data's relevance to the study of asset pricing and efficiency.
Section 2 discusses the Chinese stock market, describes the reform process and the theoretical behavior of prices of the participating companies. Section 3 describes the methodological issues, the structure of the event study and the empirical results. Section 4 concludes. Since the mid-1990s it has been possible to transfer NTS through irregularly scheduled auctions and over-the-counter transactions. According to Green and Black's (2003) analysis of (2006) for detailed accounts of the institutional aspects of the reform process. 4 In order to provide further incentives for companies to participate in the reform, the CSRC stated that reformcompliant companies would be given priority to raise new capital (new issues of shares and IPOs had been frozen since April 2005). To facilitate the reform, the Chinese government has also taken a series of measures to help stabilize the stock market. The legislative department also amended the Company Law and the Securities Law to perfect the legal framework governing the capital market. At the end of January 2006 there was a further rule change making it easier for strategic investors to buy stakes in listed companies; under the new rules the purchase of A-shares is no longer reserved to a small group of qualified investors but is extended to all investors willing to buy a minimum stake of 10% of the company and hold the shares for more than three years. 3 Empirical analysis
Methodological issues
The event study uses residuals from a pricing model. The pricing model is estimated using observations between and 6 , where is the day of the first suspension for stock i. The trading suspension prevents us from using a regression methodology that tests 5 In the literature the split is considered to be a signal of insider information on the part of the managers (see McNichols and Dravid, 1990) . In keeping with the signaling hypothesis, Ikenberry and Ramnath (2002) show that positive abnormal returns after a split are consistent with a positive revision of corporate profitability on the part of investors. 6 We have also experimented with other estimation periods ( and , and ) but the results are not affected. for the significance of a dummy variable in a regression also using event period data. The estimated parameters, ܽ ො and ܾ , are used to compute cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) in the event windows.
We will now consider simple CAPM-adjusted returns, while the following section will deal with robustness analysis, allowing the estimation of multi-factor models. For all event windows, cumulative abnormal returns are averaged across companies to obtain the mean cumulative abnormal residuals (MCARs).
We measure the variance of MCARs in three ways. Following Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997) , under the assumption of independence across abnormal residuals ε i of different firms, the variance of MCARs is:
(1) ;
where:
(2) ; is the variance of the i-th company (composed of a first term that accounts for the variance of abnormal returns and a second term that allows for estimation error), ( ) is the matrix of regressors used in the estimation period (the event window) and i is a vector of ones. We define this estimated variance as CLM variance. The null hypothesis of no abnormal returns is tested by means of the statistic:
which is asymptotically distributed as a standard normal. The disadvantage of this estimator lies in its assuming independence of residuals across firms. Our event periods are occasionally overlapping across firms because the latter are divided into batches of companies going through the reform process within similar time frames. Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997) discuss inference in event windows with clustering and notice that standard methods suffer from lack of power. We therefore compute two other estimators.
The second estimator is the cross-sectional variance (CS variance) across mean cumulative and average abnormal returns of the various companies (see Asquith, 1983and Lynch and Mendenhall, 1997). Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997) point out that the use of the CS variance is justified under the weaker assumption of cross-sectionally uncorrelated residuals. Finally, Brown and Warner (1985) point out that the CS variance is robust to the possibility of increases in the variance of the securities during the event periods. The third We denote with (for companies i=1,2…N) the parameters estimated over the bootstrap estimation period:
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In order to describe our bootstrap, we assume that there are only three firms, A, B and C, which are readmitted to trading respectively on 10 January, 15 January and 5 March 2006.
In the event study we analyze their cumulative average abnormal returns over the periods 10-20 January, 15-25 January and 5-15 March. Firms A and B have a five-day overlap. Suppose we have estimated a market model for these three companies using data for the year 2005.
We extract a (randomly selected) block of 10 consecutive observations from the cumulative abnormal residuals of A's stocks over the year 2005. We do that by randomly selecting a number between 1 and 241, say number k, from a uniform distribution and by considering the sequence of 10 residuals between k and k+9, selected from the bootstrap estimation period. In order to respect the cross-sectional dependence between companies A and B we then consider a sequence of 10 residuals for firm B between k+5 and k+14. In this way there is a five-day overlap in bootstrapped residuals, corresponding to the overlap that takes place among residuals in event windows. As to firm C, we consider 10 residuals from the bootstrap estimation period between j and j+9, where j is another number randomly extracted from a uniform distribution between 1 and 241 (excluding k and k+14), because there is no crosscorrelation to account for. We now have three artificial time-series of abnormal residuals for the three stocks, allowing for cross-sectional covariance among them. We repeat the procedure for all the firms and obtain a simulated series of abnormal returns under the null hypothesis respecting all the overlaps existing among all firms. We run the procedure 1,000 times and compute an empirical distribution of mean cumulative residuals, which is then used to carry out statistical inference about the value of MCARs obtained in our sample of data. To correct for payment of the compensation we assume that the total wealth of tradable shareholders does not change when the compensation is paid, i.e. (5) , where is the price before the compensation payment, is the price after the payment, QTS is the number of TS outstanding at the beginning of the reform process, SH is the number of shares that are transferred to TS holders and CASH is the cash compensation. 7 Few companies have paid compensation by assigning warrants. We have computed the theoretical price of warrants on the basis of the methodology proposed by Galai and Schneller (1978) . The first group includes 4 batches 8 and 120 companies, the second group includes 7 batches and 130 companies, and so on. Batches usually include a substantial number of companies, except for the first experimental batch, which only included 3 companies, and the latest 7 This is not inconsistent with the existence of a compensation-induced increase in wealth of TS holders. However this wealth increase occurred when market prices incorporated the compensation expectation after the formal announcement, several days before the second readmission. 8 We leave out the first two experimental batches from our analysis.
Qualitative characteristics of companies in the various batches of the reform
[ ]
batches of our sample, which include several companies that had not completed the reform by volume. This indicator also increases with the number of batches and shows that illiquidity differentials among companies belonging to early and late batches are very large before the reform but decrease substantially thereafter. This is coherent with the reform having a positive impact on liquidity. The price range (the difference between the maximum and minimum price on a given day) slightly increases across batches (see columns 12 and 13). Figure 2 describes the price of one specific company (Baotou Huazi Intl) before, during and after the reform. In this example, the stock price goes up before the first suspension, and again between the first and the second suspension.
Price reactions
[ INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] There is an upward jump on the day of the first readmission and a downward jump on the day of the second readmission. This pattern was frequent across companies. In the ten days before the first suspension abnormal prices increase by 2.20%, most sharply in the three days before each announcement. Cumulative returns are statistically significant if evaluated by means of t-tests, but are not significant, except for the last one, if judged on the basis of the bootstrap. This is not consistent with a risk explanation, as one would expect a positive risk premium to hold continuously throughout the period before the first readmission and any readjustment of prices due to expected demand/supply or liquidity factors to take place earlier than before the first suspension. Instead, we observe significant abnormal returns only two days before the announcement. The evidence is more consistent with information leakage/speculation than a risk story.
On the day of readmission there is a further 0.7% abnormal average return, with 67% of the companies showing an increase in the price. After the initial jump upon readmission, prices tend to increase by another (statistically significant) 1.06% in the subsequent nine trading days. While the readmission day abnormal return may be associated with a positive compensation surprise, the subsequent positive abnormal returns are not consistent with efficiency. The Merton (1987) effect, according to which investors limit the securities held in their portfolios to those "they are aware of", may be one explanation for this evidence. Media and investors are likely to be particularly interested in the stocks taking part in the reform process, particularly those that have been readmitted to trading after the first suspension. This may have created an increase in the base of investors. The large increase in the volume of trading, which will be documented in the next section, is coherent with this explanation, and may also have fostered expectations of higher stock liquidity and lower expected returns that are immediately beneficial to stock prices.
On the day of payment of the compensation, the average drop is 16.7%, but compensation-corrected prices obtained from equation (5) are on average 0.35% higher than they were when stocks were last traded before the second suspension. Prices drop 0.73% relative to the market in the ten days that follow. The decrease is significant when clustering is not taken into account but becomes less significant when clustering is allowed for and totally insignificant when the bootstrap is used. Overall, not much happens after the second readmission. This is consistent with the split having no real effects. In the literature the split is considered to be a signal of insider information on the part of managers, see McNichols   16 and Dravid (1990) . In the Chinese case, however, the split is forced by the reform process and it is less likely that managers have used it to provide specific information. 
Volume of trading

[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE]
The increase in total volume after the beginning of the reform is clearly visible: average volume equals 256 million units before the reform, rising to 649 million units after the reform. Table 3 reports average volume for the stocks participating in the reform process, both as an absolute value and as a share of market volume.
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
The average is reported before, during and after the reform process. The absolute value of volume for the stocks joining the reform process one month before suspension (338 million units, on the Shanghai market) is the simple average across stocks of the daily volume in the four weeks preceding the start of the reform process. The number represents 0.10% of total market volume over the same period. With respect to pre-reform levels, volume increased by 69% in the period after the first readmission (and before the second suspension). The increase is 55% for the Shenzhen market and 78% for Shanghai. Volume increases by 116% in the month after the second suspension (with respect to the volume before the first suspension) for each individual market.
These numbers indicate an increase in trading after the reform. We also analyze abnormal volume, using two different methodologies. The first follows Brav and Heaton (1999) and Brav and Gompers (2003) . We define normal volume as the mean daily volume from day through day relative to the day of the first suspension. Abnormal volume is the percentage difference between actual volume and normal volume. To eliminate the effect of outliers, we set observations exceeding the 99 th percentile equal to the median observation. Table 4 confirms the large increase in volume.
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] Table 4 shows that ten days before the first suspension actual volume is 14% larger than normal volume, reaching 82% on the day before suspension. On the day of the first readmission, volume is 195% higher than normal, shrinking to 21% after 10 days. On the day of the second readmission volume is 522% higher than normal, an increase shrinking to 161% after 10 days. 9 There is therefore a clear increase in trading volume both during and after the reform.
The second methodology used to analyze abnormal volume follows Ajinkya and Jain (1989) and Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) . Turnover is defined as: (6) , where is the money volume for stock i on day t and is the market value of the outstanding shares on stock i on day t. Abnormal turnover is retrieved from the residuals of a regression of company turnover on market turnover:
The regression is estimated by means of generalized least squares. 10 The coefficients of the regression are estimated using observations between times and , where is the day of the first suspension for company i. The cumulative residual analysis described in table 5 shows that companies entering the reform process have a positive abnormal turnover in the period preceding the first suspension.
[
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]
Turnover keeps increasing relative to the market in all sub-periods after the first readmission.
A very strong increase takes place after the second readmission.
Large turnover is frequently associated with mispricing. 11 However, the abnormal return analysis presented in the previous section does not show the existence of mispricing after the second readmission, regardless of the turnover boost. The most likely explanation is that the price increase after the second readmission is associated with the Merton visibility 9 We take into account the increase in the float after the second readmission. 10 The equation is estimated on the basis of OLS to retrieve the residuals. The residual is then regressed on its own lag and the slope coefficient is used as an estimate of the AR(1) coefficient to transform the original data as in the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure. Finally, OLS is applied to the transformed data. (2008) show that the combination of heterogeneous beliefs and short sale constraints may induce investors to overpay for a stock if they expect to sell it in the future to another investor with an even higher willingness to pay. Speculation is also closely linked with sentiment. Baker and Wurgler (2006) write that "one possible definition of investor sentiment is the propensity to speculate". They notice that shifts in sentiment may carry cross-sectional implications either because some stocks are harder to evaluate in an objective way or because arbitrage is more difficult. t effect and not with pure speculation. It would be hard to explain why simple speculation is at work after the first readmission but not after the second readmission.
Robustness analysis
We consider various robustness tests regarding: the definition of the market index, the risk model for computing excess returns, alternative structures for our bootstrap, and allowance for non-synchronous trading.
Our previous tests used the Shanghai and Shenzhen market indices, depending on the trading location of each stock. We also compute a float-weighted market index to evaluate the sensitivity of our results to the definition of the market. This is important also in view of the large difference between float and capitalization caused by the existence of NTS. A capitalization index would include the quantity of both TS and NTS to compute the weights assigned to the various stocks and would provide a measure not reflecting actual market conditions. Wang and Xu (2004) The size and floating ratio factors were built following the methodology described by Fama and French (1996) . At the beginning of each month, Shanghai (SSE) and Shenzhen (ZSE) stocks are allocated to two groups (small or big) based on whether their market value during the previous month was below or above the median market value for the specific market. Then stocks are sorted into three float ratio groups (low, medium, or high) based on the bottom 30 percent, middle 40 percent and top 30 percent of the floating ratio (FR). Valueweighted portfolio returns are then computed for each portfolio. The size factor is the difference between the returns of small and big portfolios. The floating ratio factor is the difference between average returns of the high-FR portfolios and average returns of two low-
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FR. 12 Theoretically, the average return of the floating ratio factor should be negative as it represents a portfolio long on good governance companies and short on bad governance companies. However, Wang and Xu (2004) themselves find that the average return of floating ratio factor is negative, explaining this result on the basis of the better performance displayed by companies with more efficient governance. It is therefore unclear whether FR is a true proxy for a non-diversifiable risk factor. Similarly, we build a liquidity portfolio after ranking stocks on the basis of their liquidity indicators as in Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) . The correlation between our own index and the Shanghai and Shenzhen indices are always above 93%. There is some difference in the mean and the median returns in the first sub- identification of these portfolios as risk factors, we notice that two years is a short sample and the actual returns may well not be good proxies of expected returns. In the previous subsample average returns are positive, except for the liquidity factor, which is essentially zero. Table 7 reports the event study derived from the abnormal returns factor model.
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE]
The results are very similar to those of table 2, except that positive cumulative abnormal returns are significant for the four days before the first suspension from trading and the total decrease after the second readmission is about half the estimate we had before. Basic conclusions do not change, as a four-day increase in prices is more likely to be associated with information about the identity of the companies to be suspended than with a risk premium. Table 8 reports the robustness analysis for our bootstrap methodology. We estimate the market model using data over 140 days, 250 days and 500 days. Table 8 reports the pvalues obtained on the basis of the three procedures and shows that the results are very robust to alternative choices of the estimation period to be used.
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE]
Finally, we compute our event studies on the basis of the Dimson (1979) estimator, allowing for non-synchronous trading through leads and lags of the market return. The results are almost unchanged. They are not reported here but are available upon request.
Conclusions
We have studied the reaction of stock returns and trading volume to a structural reform of the Chinese stock market. Our main results are: (i) abnormal returns are positive in the two days before the first suspension. The increase in prices before the first suspension could be due either to a premium for the non-diversifiable compensation risk or to speculation. We are inclined to favor the latter explanation as positive abnormal returns emerge only in the two days before the suspension, while a risk premium would have been associated with a more gradual and extended increase.
(ii) Abnormal returns are positive in the ten days after the first readmission. This cannot be justified by new information. One possibility is that they are due to a delayed reaction to compensation surprise. Another possibility is that investors are more attracted to stocks neglected before the reform.
Enhanced liquidity may also play a role. (iii) Prices drop after the second readmission (-0.73% cumulatively), even though the evidence is not significant from a statistical point of view. (iv) Volume increases to record levels during and after the reform, even accounting for the increase in the supply of shares assigned as compensation. The increase in turnover that is associated with positive abnormal returns after the first readmission but not after the second readmission raises the possibility that investors have a higher demand for securities they were not familiar with before the reform and makes it less likely that the results can be explained by general turnover-induced speculation activity.
Overall, our results do not point to the existence of gross valuation errors on the part of Chinese investors. Speculation may have been at work but does not seem to dominate the picture. We have to acknowledge the complexities of measuring the rational price response in such a big structural change for the market, allowing for changes in liquidity, volume, demand/supply imbalance, visibility. A statistically significant cumulative abnormal return of approximately 170 basis points is certainly economically relevant, but may be explained by a visibility effect together with the expected benefits of enhanced liquidity. (CLM variance) and under the assumption of no correlation across abnormal residuals (CS variance; see Asquith, 1983 and Lynch and Mendenhall,1997 Number of shares
